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1. IntroductionA central issue of the financial microstructure literature is the analysis of the infor-
mation content of trades. Froma theoretical viewpoint, the stochastic process of prices
should be a function of the trading process. Market participants learn from the se-
quence of trades, update their beliefs, and this causes prices to move. Since the behav-
ior of the stochastic process of prices is behind most of the questions studied in
financial economics, it becomes fundamental to understand this learning mechanism.
As the literature shows, every feature of the trading process which is correlated
with the value of the asset, may provide information to market participants. For ex-
ample, in Easley and OHara (1987), the trade size is what provides information, but
in Easley and OHara (1992) is the timing of trades. From an empirical perspective,
there is no clear consensus about what actually drives the relation between trades
and prices. For Jones et al. (1994) is the occurrence of transactions per se, and not
their size, what contains relevant information for pricing securities. However, Huang
and Masulis (1999) and Chan and Fong (2000) conclude that trade size contains no
trivial information. Dufour and Engle (2000) report that both the trade duration and
the trade size are informative. Finally, Kempf and Korn (1999) report a non-linear
relationship between the trade size and the price impact. These conflicting findings
suggest that trade size could be an unsatisfactory indicator of the information risk
and that traders learn from more complex interactions of several trade features.
A related topic deals with the estimation of the theoretical components of the bid
ask spread. Adverse selection costs (Bagehot, 1971) are usually characterized as the
permanent impact that a trade-related shock produces on the equilibrium value of
the stock. Current methods are based on structural models with an exogenous trad-
ing process characterized either by a buy sell indicator (e.g., Huang and Stoll, 1997)
or by the trade size (e.g., Glosten and Harris, 1988). However, there are serious con-
cerns about the ability of these models to measure adverse selection costs. Recently,
Van Ness et al. (2001) examine the relation between adverse selection costs estima-
tors and corporate finance indicators of information asymmetry. They conclude that
structural models perform weakly. The results are similar to the ones obtained using
the posted spread and therefore bring into question the added benefit of these theo-
retical measures. Hasbrouck (1991a,b) introduced an alternative reduced-form ap-
proach where the permanent impact of a trade can be estimated through the
impulse-response function (IRF) of a vector autoregressive (VAR) model for quotes
and trades. In the context of an order-driven market, de Jong et al. (1996) study the
price impacts of trading using two alternative specifications: the Glosten (1994)
model and the VAR model. Once again, in this context the information content of
trades is characterized only by the trade size. They show that the estimates of the
average adverse selection costs based on the Hasbroucks model are twice as large
of those of the structural model. The reason for the different price effect estimates
is that structural models assume that prices disseminate immediately all the informa-
tion content of a trade. On the contrary, the VAR model accounts for the dynamic
impact of trades. We conjecture that if the quote adjustment to trade-related shocks
is progressive, informed traders would try to profit from this transitory erroneous
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pricing. This might cause persistency in the information-asymmetry risk and unusual
short-term market conditions. Hence, the analysis of the quote-adjustment period
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tfter trade-related shocks becomes an attractive but almost ignored issue.
In this paper, we will analyze the learning process from the study of IBM, a NYSE-
isted stock. Our main goal is to describe the dynamics of the price discovery process
fter a trade, contingent on its information asymmetry risk. In particular, we focus on
hree questions: How long does it take for market participants to learn from trades?
ow does this learning process depend on the expected risk of the trade? How does
t affect the behavior of traders and the conditions of the market? In order to answer
hese questions, we will measure the expected information content of each IBM trade
erformed in February June 1996 using the IRF of a generalized Hasbroucks VAR
odel. One of the methodological innovations will be that the information risk of a
articular trade is a function of several observable trade features and simultaneously
f certain market conditions, allowing for a more accurate characterization of the ex-
ected price impact. Thus, two trades of equal size could be perceived as having differ-
nt information risk if they are executed under different market conditions. Another
ethodological improvement will be that we provide an estimation of the time (in
umber of events) that quotes need to incorporate all the information content of a par-
icular trade. Huang and Stoll (1996), using a non-parametric procedure, computed
he price impact of a trade over a ‘‘long enough’’ time horizon in order to incorporate
ll the information into the prices. However, this time horizon was arbitrary and con-
tant. We want to find evidence that the periods of price adjustment depend on trade
eatures, on market environments and on the timing of the trade.
Our findings will reinforce the relevance of the trading process as a determinant of
he stochastic process of prices, although that relationship will be more complex than
he one represented in a simple one-period adverse selection costs model. In summary,
e will show that the market accelerates after risky trades. The trading frequency aug-
ents following trades with a high expected-risk. Indeed, the progressive quote align-
ents after trades originate sequences of trades with a similar (but decreasing)
nformation-asymmetry risk. This suggests competition between informed traders
e.g., Holden and Subrahmanyam, 1992), which quickens the dissemination of the
ew trade-inferred information. Consequently, price discovery improves after risky
rades.Wewill also evidence that quotes adjust faster to the trade-inferred information
uring the opening and closinghours of the trading session.Finally, in accordancewith
he short-term persistency in the information-asymmetry risk, we will report short-
erm anomalies in themarket conditions after risky trades. Volatility and trading activ-
ty both increase and liquidity decreases with the estimated long-term impact of trades.
The structure of the paper is the following. In Section 2, we present the economet-
ic model. In Section 3, we describe the data, discuss methodological details and
eport some preliminary estimation. In Section 4, we analyze the intra-daily distribu-
ion of adverse selection costs and the relative importance of this theoretical compo-
ent of the spread. In Section 5, we evidence short-term persistency of the
nformation-asymmetry risk. In Section 6, we measure the speed of adjustment of
he quotes to trade-related shocks. In Section 7, we study the short-term market reac-
ion to risky trades. Finally, in Section 8 we summarize the main empirical findings.
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2. The information content of tradesThe permanent impact of the unexpected component of a trade on the equilibrium
value of the stock is an appropriate measure of its information-asymmetry risk. To see
this, letmt be the efficient price, the expected true value of the stock in some future end-
of-trading time conditional on the public information available at moment tðUtÞ. This
efficient price follows the random walk process mt ¼ mt1 þ wt, where the innovation
wt is unpredictable given Ut1. Hence, non-zero values of wt are updates of the public
information set. A shock that affects to wt will have a permanent price impact because
it alters the expected long-run value of the stock. Let xt be a trade indicator that equals
1 for a buyer-initiated trade and 1 for a seller-initiated trade. The unexpected com-
ponent of a trade is denoted by v2;t ðv2;t ¼ xt  E½xtjUt1Þ. Given that the predictable
component of the trade is already incorporated into mt1, only v2;t provides new infor-
mation to market participants. Hence, E½wtjv2;t is the permanent price impact of a
trade. Imposing linearity, we have that wt ¼ av2;t þ v1;t where v1;t is a trade-unrelated
shock (E½v1;tjv2;t ¼ 0 and E½v1;tv1;tijv2;t ¼ 0 8i 6¼ 0). Hence, E½wtjv2;t ¼ av2;t. The
parameter a > 0 measures the portion of the innovation in the trading process that
becomes new information. Therefore, a captures the adverse selection costs associated
to the trade xt. Structural models (e.g., Madhavan et al., 1997 and Huang and Stoll,
1997) build on similar constructions to estimate a from observable quote and trade
data. However, these methods end up with an estimation of a constant average
adverse selection costs for all trades in the sample, while we are looking for a proce-
dure that allow us to estimate the expected risk of a particular trade, say at.
Under the hypothesis that the public information set is exclusively given by the
past evolution of trades and quotes, Hasbrouck (1991a,b) introduced a reduced-form
method to model the dynamic relationship between the trading process and the sub-
sequent adjustment of market quotes. This methodology is based on a general VAR
model for the quote midpoint changes and for the trade indicator xt previously
defined. Following Dufour and Engle (2000), in this paper we use a generalization
of the Hasbrouck (1991a) model,
Dqt ¼
X1
i 1
aiDqti þ
X1
i 0
aqi
"
þ bq0i MCti þ
X
h6 4
kqhD
h
ti
#
xti þ v1;t;wher
term
uncoxt ¼
X1
i 1
ciDqti þ
X1
i 1
axi
"
þ bx0i MCti þ
X
h6 4
kxhD
h
ti
#
xti þ v2;t;
ð1Þ
e Dqt ¼ ðqt  qt1Þ is the change in the quote midpoint after the trade xt. The
s v1;t andv2;t are the formerly introduced zero-mean mutually and serially
rrelated stochastic processes. We assume that the market participants learnfrom the trade features and the market environment. Therefore, the impact of a
trade depends on a set of exogenous variables included in the vector MCt that
characterizes the trade and the market conditions. Vectors bqi and b
x
i have dimension
k  1, where k is the number of variables in MCt. The vector Dt contains dummies
that locate the trade inside the trading session.
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Microstructure theory suggests several indicators that may be correlated with the
value of the asset. Easley and OHara (1987), among others, suggest that large-sized
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srades may hide impatient traders with a perishable information advantage. Has-
rouck (1991a) and de Jong et al. (1996) evidence the relevance of the trade size
n the VAR methodology. Easley and OHara (1992) propose a model in which a
eduction in the time between consecutive trades (trade duration) is an indicator
f new information arriving at the market. Dufour and Engle (2000) test the pre-
ictions of Easley and OHaras model using the VAR methodology. Copeland
nd Galai (1983), and French and Roll (1986), among others, manifest the rele-
ance of price volatility in determining liquidity in general and market quotes in
articular. As far as we know, this is the first paper that incorporates volatility into
he VAR framework. Finally, it is well known that adverse selection costs and
iquidity are negatively related (e.g., Kyle, 1985). Following Lee et al. (1993), in this
aper liquidity is measured by both immediacy costs and depth. In model (1), all
hese variables interact with the trade indicator to determine the long-run impact
f a particular trade. Therefore, the estimated impact of a large-sized trade should
epend on the quoted spread, the market depth, the price volatility, the trade
uration, etc.
The VAR methodology turns out to be more flexible than the methods based on
tructural models. First, the trading process is not exogenous. This feature is relevant
s far as a trade-related shock might cause posterior effects on the trading process
we show it does). If these dynamic effects were due to the same informative event,
he initial impact would be just one part of the long-term impact of a trade-related
hock. Second, if the information provided by a trade is not instantaneously incor-
orated into prices, the trade might also have lagged effects on quotes. The structure
f the system of equations (1) accommodates all those dynamic effects on both the
rading process and the market quotes. 3
The VAR model captures, as special cases, the dynamics behind the structural
odels of quote formation. Indeed, the IRF of the VAR model (e.g., Sims, 1980)
s an appropriate estimator of the parameter a, the long-term impact of a shock in
he trading process (see Hasbrouck, 1991a). In this paper, we use the IRF of (1)
s the proxy for the adverse selection costs. This IRF is conditional on the market
ituation and the trade features and, therefore, it is trade-specific ðatÞ. The Section
describes the database, provides the details of the derivation and implementation
f the IRF, and describes the methodology used to measure the trade-specific infor-
ation risk.
3 The VAR model has some important econometric drawbacks. The homoskedasticity assumption inhe distribution of v1;t and v2;t is restrictive given the vast evidence about intra daily deterministic patterns
n volatility. Defining the model in trade time should mitigate the effect of a latent heteroskedasticity.
asbrouck (1999) and Hausman et al. (1992) propose models for market quotes that do not assume
omoskedasticity. However, in these models the trading process is endogenous. In addition, Escribano and
ascual (2000) evidence an important loss of information in averaging the quote behavior through the
uote midpoint. They propose a vector error correction model for ask and bid prices, with the bid ask
pread as the error correction term, that generalizes the VAR model (see also Hasbrouck, 1991a,b, 1996).
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3. Data and model estimationWe use IBM trade and quote data from the TAQ database. We consider all the
trading days during the first semester of 1996. IBM was one of the most frequently
traded stocks during that period. This guarantees a number of observations large
enough to perform the posterior empirical analysis. We only keep trades and quotes
from the primary market (NYSE). Trades not codified as ‘‘regular trades’’ are not
considered. These trades, out of sequence, cancelled or corrected due to errors,
represent less than the 0.1% of the entire sample. Trades with the same price and time
stamp are treated as just one trade. All the quotes and trades registered before the
opening or after the closing of the sessions are dropped. The overnight changes in
quotes are treated as missing values. Quotes with bid ask spreads lower than or
equal to zero or quoted depth equal to zero are also eliminated. Price and quote files
are coupled using the so-called ‘‘5 s rule’’ (see Lee and Ready, 1991). This rule
assigns to each trade the first quote stamped at least 5 s before the trade itself. A
trade is classified as buyer (seller) initiated when the price is closer to the ask (bid)
price than to the bid (ask) price. Henceforth, the first ones are called ‘‘buys’’ and
the second ones are called ‘‘sells’’. The indicator xt equals 1 for buys, 1 for sells,
and 0 for trades with execution price equal to the quote midpoint. The changes
in quotes Dqt ¼ ðqt  qt1Þ are computed as the difference between the quotes that
correspond to the trade xtþ1 and to the trade xt.
Five exogenous variables are included in the vector MCt. The number of shares
ðVtÞ measures the trade size. The time in seconds since the preceding trade ðTtÞ is
the trade duration. The quoted bid ask spread measures immediacy costs ðStÞ.
The average number of shares offered at the best ask and bid prices is the quoted
depth ðQDtÞ. 4 Volatility ðRtÞ is computed as the implicit volatility in the time series
of Dqtðr2t Þ. It is obtained using the GARCH(1,1) model (2), estimated by maximum
likelihood with the robust variance covariance matrix of Bollerslev and Wooldridge
(1992). It offers the best fitting among all the models tested, including ARCH and
EGARCH (e.g., Bollerslev et al., 1992). All coefficients are highly statistically signif-
icant. 54 An anonymous referee suggested that asymmetric depth could be more correlated with adverse
selection costs than the average depth. Adverse selection costs, inventory control and barrier theories
about asymmetric depth are discussed in Huang and Stoll (1994) and Engle and Patton (2000).
Unfortunately, the VAR model cannot accommodate this variable. It is easy to check that, independently
of the proxy used, the VAR model is not useful to determine which one of these competing theories is the
appropriate theoretical framework.
5 Although GARCH family models have been widely applied to financial time series, there are few
examples of GARCH models applied to not equally spaced time series (e.g., Bollerslev and Melvin, 1994).
For this reason, we have repeated the analysis with other volatility measures. They are constructed using
the quote midpoint changes observed during a given time interval (from 1 to 5 min) before the time stamp
of each trade. The absolute total change, the accumulated absolute and squared changes and the difference
between the maximum and the minimum values of the quote midpoint during each interval are some of the
measures considered. The VAR estimations are consistent across proxies and the conclusions unaltered.
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Vt tra
QDt q
(implici
for sellsAdj R : 0:001497; ProbðF Þ ¼ 0:0000:
define eight trading-time dummy variables: one for the first half-hour of trad-
e for each hour in the 10:00 15:00 interval and, finally, two for the last half-our intervals. Therefore, we isolate the opening and closing periods of the session.
ll of the dummy variables, except the one corresponding to the 12:00 13:00 interval
D4t Þ, were initially included in the estimation, interacting with contemporaneous and
agged values of the trade indicator xt. Nonetheless, preliminary F tests showed that
nly the dummy variables affecting to the contemporaneous value of xt were jointly
tatistically significant. Moreover, only the dummy corresponding to the first trading
nterval (9:30 10:00) became statistically significant at the 1% level. Eq. (3) shows
he VAR model finally estimated.
able 1
stimation of the VAR modelna
vari
Dependent variables Explanatory
variables
Dependent variables
Dqt xt Dqt xt
27.2 4174.8 xtRt 509.9
22.5 296.8 xt 1Rt 1 18.5 13905
24.8 590.8 xt 2Rt 2 98.8 7018.6
16.3 383.8 xt 3Rt 3 36.6 2871.3
13.7 383.8 xt 4Rt 4 43.2 8484.2
0.7408 xt 5Rt 5 237.9 2427.3
2.4121 301.2 xtSt 116.8
0.2684 127.7 xt 1St 1 17.6 853.7
0.5438 48.5 xt 2St 2 7.25 102.7
0.6255 55.5 xt 3St 3 5.72 83.7
1.7085 44.4 xt 4St 4 3.9 51.6
8.84E-04 xt 5St 5 10.8 118.4
1 2.99E-04 0.0023 xtQDt 0.0329
2 3.53E-05 0.0021 xt 1QDt 1 0.0026 0.3559
3 3.43E 05 0.0018 xt 2QDt 2 0.0072 0.0849
4 2.72E 05 0.0014 xt 3QDt 3 0.0053 0.1871
5 6.23E-06 0.0022 xt 4QDt 4 0.0013 0.0344
0.0607 xt 5QDt 5 0.0035 0.0186
1 0.0189 0.0101 xtD1t 1.642
2 0.0004 0.231 xt 1D1t 1 34.2
3 0.0024 0.265 Adj R2: 0.2001
4 0.0005 0.1674 No. obs.: 125164
5 0.0094 0.1246 F(42,125164): 746.58 Prob > F : 0.0000
le reports the Generalized Least Squares (GLS) coefficient (·1000) estimates of the VAR model in
g all IBM trades from January to June 1996. Coefficients in bold indicate significant at the 1% level.
de size (in number of shares). Tt time (in seconds) since the preceding trade. St bid ask spread.
uoted depth (average between depth at the ask and depth at the bid prices). Rt volatility
t volatility of Dqt estimated with a GARCH (1,1) model), qt quote midpoint, xt 1 for buys, 1
and 0 otherwise.
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ble 1 displays the estimated coefficients of the VAR model (3) using all trades in
ample. Several tests show that ordinary least squares (OLS) residuals are het-eroskedastic but not autocorrelated. Hence, we estimate the model using generalized
least squares (GLS). The estimated coefficients are consistent with those found in
previous studies and are consistent with the predictions of adverse selection costs
models. A large-sized trade, executed a few seconds after the previous trade, within
an illiquid and price-volatile period has a larger expected impact on quotes. The ini-
tial impact is statistically significant for all exogenous variables (interacting with the
trade indicator). Lagged effects are especially relevant for trade-size, immediacy costs
and trade durations. The trade equation shows the strong positive autocorrelation of
signed trades previously evidenced by Hasbrouck (1991a). In summary, a shock in
the trading process produces an instantaneous adjustment reinforced with later dy-
namic adjustments on both the trading activity and the market quotes. This implies
progressive rather than immediate adjustments to trade-related shocks.
Finally, we approximate the vector moving average representation of (3) by
Monte Carlo simulation. The IRF provides an estimation of the accumulated impact
of each trade on quotes, conditional on market conditions and trade features. We
call this conditional accumulated impact ItðDqtjv2;t;MCt;DtÞ. A larger expected im-
pact means a higher information-asymmetry risk assigned to the trade. The simu-
lated impact for the case of infinite order polynomials appears in Eq. (4). The
asterisk means a simulated value, not observed. 6
eItðDqtjv2;t;MCt;DtÞ ¼ Xn
y 1
ay
Xny
i 1
Dqtþi
" #
þ
Xn
y 0
aqy
Xny
i 1
xtþi
"
þ v2;t
#
þ
Xn
y 0
ðbqyÞT" #

Xny
i 1
ðMCtþi þ kq0DtþiÞxtþi þ ðMCt þ kq0DtÞv2;t :
ð4Þ
o perform the simulation, we must define the generating process of the exogenous variables. We have
ed that each of them follows a general probabilistic process exogenous to the VARmodel (3) that weapproximated by a linear autoregressive (AR) model. We include dummies that control for
inistic intra daily patterns. Furthermore, the expected impact of a trade should only depend on the
t of preceding trades. For this reason, the IRF for the first trade in February is obtained using the
model estimated with all trades in January (around 24.000 trades). For the second trade in February,
R model is estimated with all trades in January but the first one and adding the first trade in
ary, and so on. In this manner, the sample used to estimate (3) changes for each simulated trade but
ple size remains constant. Simultaneously, the coefficients of the VAR model are revised trade after
Due to space limitations, we do not provide all the details of the simulations run. However, they are
ed in the working paper version of this paper, which can be downloaded in pdf format from the web
ttp://www.eco.uc3m.es/personal/cv/alvaroe.html.
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In the empirical analysis n ¼ 50 and, as in Hasbrouck (1991a,b), de Jong et al.
(1996), and Dufour and Engle (2000), the polynomials in the VAR model (3) aretruncated at lag five. Because of the definition of xt, midpoint trades are not simu-
lated ðxt ¼ 0Þ. Moreover, the conditional expectation of xt has to take values in
the range of possible values ½1; 1 during all the simulation steps. This may not
be the case for extreme values of MCt. These observations have been detected and
dropped. After all, we estimated the IRF of nearly 80.000 trades.
To compute the adverse selection, we first locate the step st of the simulation that
reaches the 99% of the total estimated impact. Notice that st is an estimator of the
time (in number of posterior trades) required for prices to reflect all the information
conveyed by the trade. The accumulated impact at this point is our estimation of the
adverse selection costs of that trade ðASCtÞ. 7 Using the percentiles of the empirical
distribution of the absolute value of ASCt, trades are classified in five groups, from
lower to higher expected risk. A trade belongs to ASC(1) if jASCtj < P ð0:25Þ, to
ASC(2) if P ð25Þ6 jASCtj < P ð50Þ, to ASC(3) if P ð50Þ6 jASCtj < Pð75Þ, to ASC(4)
if P ð75Þ6 jASCtj < P ð95Þ and, finally, to ASC(5) if jASCtjP Pð95Þ, where P ðjÞ rep-
resents the value of the j% percentile. Reference values are P ð25Þ ¼ 0:0503, P ð50Þ ¼
0:0629, P ð75Þ ¼ 0:0855 and P ð95Þ ¼ 0:1292. The median proportion of ASCt ex-
plained by the initial shock is 23.09%, with an interquartile range of 11.12%, and
the median proportion after the first five simulation steps is 72.02% (15.05). There-
fore, once all the dynamics are taken into account, it is observed that an important
part of the long-run impact of a trade is associated to the posterior dynamics. This
result is consistent across the five risk levels.
4. Preliminary findings4.1. The intra-daily distribution of adverse selection costs
Wei (1992), Foster and Viswanathan (1990, 1993), and Madhavan et al. (1997)
suggest that adverse selection costs are not uniformly distributed throughout the
day. These costs decrease towards the end of the session, together with an increase
in inventory holding costs (see Madhavan et al., 1997). This finding is consistent with
having a higher concentration of information-motivated, versus liquidity-motivated
traders, during the initial intervals of the trading session. We are able to check this
hypothesis using ASCt.
Fig. 1 shows the empirical distribution of the IBM trades by trading interval and
adverse selection costs level, measured by ASCt. We divide the session in thirteen
half-hour intervals. Bands of the same color represent the percentage of trades be-
longing to ASCðjÞ, j ¼ f1; . . . ; 5g, executed in each interval (the 13 bands of the
7 We have also considered the 50%, 75% and 90% of the total estimated impact to define ASCt.
Spearman rank correlations are significantly superior to the 95%. Neither the classification of thesimulated trades nor the empirical findings in the next sections are remarkably affected by the percentage
considered.
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same color sum to the 100%). The column height is the sum of all five percentages
per interval. The distribution of the trading activity exhibits the usual U-shaped pat-
tern. The trades with the highest expected adverse selection costs, ASC(4) and
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Fig. 1. Intra daily distribution of the information asymmetry risk. Figure shows the percentage of trades in
each ASCðjÞ category, j 1; . . . ; 5, that were performed in each half hour interval of the trading session.ASC(5), concentrate at the edges of the session. The 47.62% of all trades belonging
to ASC(5) were performed during the opening (36.37%) and closing (11.25%) half-
hours. Similarly, the 31.66% of all trades classified as ASC(4) were accomplished
during these intervals, 18.32% only during the first half-hour. In contrast, ASC(1)
trades are detected mainly in the middle of the session and only the 2.99% in the first
half-hour of trading. Previous results manifest that the risk of trading with an in-
formed agent is the highest during the opening interval. The ASC(5) and ASC(4)
trades represent more than the 50% of all trades observed between 9:30 and 10:00
a.m. At the closing of the sessions, these trades are the 32.15% of all trades executed.
On the contrary, ASC(1) and ASC(2) trades represent the 25.14% of trades during
the opening period versus the 67.62% between 1:00 and 1:30 p.m. and the 64.45%
between 1:30 2:00 p.m. In the next sections, we evidence that this non-uniform dis-
tribution of informed trading is reflected in the price discovery speed.
4.2. The relevance of adverse selection costs in a dynamic contextUsing data from the Paris Bourse, de Jong et al. (1996) estimate the adverse selec-tion costs component of the bid ask spread using two alternative approaches, a
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structural model based on Glosten (1994) and the Hasbroucks VAR model. These
authors assume that only the trade size provides information to the market partici-
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bants and, hence, the permanent price impact of trades depends only on this vari-
ble. They show that the estimates of the average adverse selection costs based on
he Hasbroucks model are twice as large of those of the structural model. The reason
s that the Glostens model assumes that prices immediately disseminate all the infor-
ation conveyed by a trade and therefore ignores the lagged price effects. Indeed,
his is a usual feature of adverse selection costs models (e.g., Glosten and Harris,
988; Madhavan et al., 1997 and Huang and Stoll, 1997). In this section, we extend
he de Jong et al.s analysis in several ways: we use a more complete characterization
f the price impact ðASCtÞ, we compare the results for trades with different risk lev-
ls, we control for the intra-daily regularities observed in the previous subsection
nd, finally, we use NYSE data.
We use Lin et al. (1995) methodology as the theoretical referent. 8 Eq. (5) summa-
izes this method,
ðqt  qt1Þ ¼ dðPt  qt1Þ þ et; ð5Þ
here Pt represents the execution price of the trade, et is the error term, jPt  qt1j is
he ha
Tab
ion co
rades
y the t
ess et
etter tlf-effective spread and the parameter dmeasures adverse selection costs. Notice
hat d is the percentage of the effective spread that is not realized due to the im-
ediate quote-change after the trade. Under the assumption that trades incorporate
t once the information content of the trade, this immediate change equals the total
rice impact. With the sample of simulated trades, we estimate Eq. (5) by OLS ro-
ust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form (Newey and West,
987). We obtain that the average adverse selection costs represent the d^ ¼ 26:3% of
he effective spread.
The first column of coefficients in Table 2 shows the results of estimating Eq. (6),
hich is a generalization of (5) where we control for the trading interval and the risk
f asymmetric information. The Dht , h ¼ f1; . . . ; 8g, are dummy variables to control
or the trading interval. The Qjt , j ¼ f1; . . . ; 5g, are the dummy variables representing
he risk of asymmetric information, that is Qjt equals 1 if ASCt 2 ASCðjÞ and 0 other-
ise. The variable ut is the error term.
Dqt ¼ d0ðPt  qt1Þ þ
X5
j 2
½djQðPt  qt1ÞQjt þ
X8
h 1
h 6 4
½dhDðPt  qt1ÞDht þ ut: ð6Þle 2 shows that the percentage of total immediacy costs due to adverse selec-
sts increases significantly with ASCðjÞ, running from the 15.97% for ASC(1)
to the 29.95% for ASC(5) trades. Moreover, the trades executed during the8 We choose Lin et al. (1995) because it is one of the most used models in practice (e.g., Brockman and
hung, 1999). It does not require the estimation of dynamic equations; then, the results will be unaffectedrades we removed (see Section 3). Finally, its parametric simplicity facilitates generalizations. Van
al. (2001) compare several structural models and conclude that no single model appears to perform
han the others.
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first half-hour of trading have a 2.55% risk premium. The second column of coeffi-
cients in Table 2 contains the estimation of (6) but replacing the dependent variable
Dq with the initial impact of the trade obtained by the simulation of the VAR model
Table 2
Adverse selection costs over the total immediacy costs
Coefficient ð100Þa Dqt Initial impact (simulation)
d0 15.9793 16.1386
d2Q 5.1832 2.8813
d3Q 10.5893 5.1355
d4Q 12.2063 6.4202
d5Q 13.9802 10.1475
d1D [9:30 10:00) 2.5499 1.9521
d2D [10:00 11:00) 1.2797 1.0046
d3D [11:00 12:00) 0.7079 0.2678
d5D [13:00 14:00) 0.5919 0.0478
d6D [14:00 15:00) 0.6355 0.0242
d7D [15:00 15:30) 1.2583 0.7867
d8D [15:30 16:00) 0.6813 0.7202
Adj R2 (NW) 0.2055 0.2121
This table summarizes the results of estimating the percentage of the effective spread that is due to adverse
selection costs. The Lin et al.s (1995) model has been extended in order to control for intra daily effects
and the risk level due to information asymmetries, see Eq. (6). The model is estimated by OLS with the
Newey and West (1987) robust method. Two alternative dependent variables have been used: the observed
change in the midpoint of the bid ask spread (the original variable in Lin et al., 1995) and the initial (first
step) impact estimated by the simulation of the VAR model in (3).
a Format in bold means significant at the 1% level.t
(3). The percentages are similar to those obtained with the observed data but, in this
case, the trades accomplished during the final interval of the session have also a risk
premium. Therefore, if only the initial impact of the trade is considered, adverse se-
lection costs represent, in average terms, no more than the 30 32% of the effective
spread. However, this conclusion changes when the dynamic effects of trades are
taken into consideration. As in de Jong et al. (1996), we compute the ratio of the cor-
responding ASCt value to the half-effective spread, eI st ðDqtjv2;t;MCt;DtÞ=ðPt  qt1Þ.
The median simulated total price impact represents the 80% for ASC(3) trades,
the 90% for ASC(4) trades and more than the 100% for ASC(5) trades. This result
is consistent with de Jong et al. (1996) finding that large trades of the Paris Bourse
have a permanent price impact larger than the quoted bid ask spread. This finding
manifests that adverse selection costs in a dynamic framework are far more impor-
tant than the one-period structural models would suggest. The quoted spread for a
frequently traded stock (most of the time equal to the tick, US$ 1/8 in 1996) may not
compensate for the costs of providing liquidity to trades with a high risk. This result
reflects two reasonable issues. First, informed traders prefer to trade when the stock
is liquid. Second, the specialist duty of maintaining stable liquidity conditions forces
him/her to offer spreads that could be insufficient to compensate high-risk levels.
These losses, however, would be compensated with the liquidity-motivated traders.
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5. Risk persistencyPrevious sections have shown the relevance of the dynamic impacts of trade-
related shocks on both the quotes and the trading process. The information content
of a trade is not instantaneously incorporated into prices, suggesting that market
participants take some intervals of trading to have their expectational differences re-
solved (e.g., Harris and Raviv, 1993). Under these circumstances, it would be reason-
able to find additional trades taking profits from the temporal divergence between
market quotes and the efficient price. That is, we should observe sequences of trades
with similar (but decreasing) values of ASCt In this section we study the expected
short-run risk persistency by modeling the time series of ASCt.
The usual unit-root tests (extended Dickey and Fuller, 1979, and Phillips and Per-
ron, 1988) show that the ASCt time series is a Ið0Þ process. Moreover, the autocor-
relation and partial autocorrelation functions indicate that ASCt can be modeled as
an AR process of finite order ðARðpÞÞ, with p at least equal to 3. Both the informa-
tion inferred from the trading process and the possible transitory deviation between
the efficient price and qt are expected to increase with ASCðjÞ, j ¼ f1; . . . ; 5g. Thus,
our intuition is that the magnitude of the AR coefficients of the ARðpÞ model should
also increase with the estimated ASCt. We proceed with the estimation of the trun-
cated AR(5) model, see Eq. (7), for the time series of ASCt using the GLS method.
The dummies Qjt , j ¼ f1; . . . ; 5g, were defined in Section 4.2. These dummy variables
consider five thresholds in the AR structure of ASCt. The ut is the error term of the
model. Table 3 summarizes the estimation results.
Table 3
Risk persistency
a 1 2 3 4 5Coefficient Qt : ASC(1) Qt : ASC(2) Qt : ASC(3) Qt : ASC(4) Qt : ASC(5)
/j1 0.3333 0.4082 0.5896 0.7427 0.8964
(0.0118) (0.0193) (0.0120) (0.0189) (0.0470)
/j2 0.1279 0.1229 0.1191 0.0755 0.0285
(0.0142) (0.0186) (0.0131) (0.0175) (0.0690)
/j3 0.1222 0.0907 0.0436 0.0257 0.0719
(0.0140) (0.0184) (0.0136) (0.0174) (0.0794)
/j4 0.1007 0.0918 0.0729 0.0421 0.0153
(0.0138) (0.0114) (0.0109) (0.0155) (0.0461)
/j5 0.1513 0.1693 0.1298 0.1402 0.1291
(0.0114) (0.0119) (0.0097) (0.0158) (0.0469)
Adj R2 0:9497, Prob > F 0:0000.
This table shows the estimated GLS coefficients of the truncated AR(5) model in (7). Robust standard
errors are in parenthesis. The time series ASCt is built with the estimated adverse selection costs corre
sponding to all IBM trades executed from February to June 1996. A trade belongs to the set ASC(1) if
jASCtj < Pð0:25Þ, to ASC(2) if P ð25Þ6 jASCtj < P ð50Þ, to ASC(3) if Pð50Þ6 jASCtj < P ð75Þ, to ASC(4) if
P ð75Þ6 jASCtj < Pð95Þ and, finally, to ASC(5) if jASCtjP Pð95Þ, where PðyÞ represents the value of the
y% percentile of the empirical distribution of ASCt. The dummy Q
j
t equals 1 if ASCt 2 ASCðjÞ, j
f1; . . . ; 5g, and 0 otherwise.
a Format in bold means statistically significant at the 1% level.
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paperble 3 reveals significant differences in the autocorrelation structure of the time
s ASCt across the five levels of adverse selection costs. Using the Wald test (e.g.,Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993) we reject (at the 1% level) the null hypothesis that
the sums of the AR coefficients corresponding to each pair ASCðjÞ and ASCðkÞ, with
j 6¼ k, are equal. Indeed, the sum of the AR coefficients increases with ASCðjÞ,
j ¼ f1; . . . ; 5g. This means that trades with high information-asymmetry risk (large
ASCt value) are likely followed by similar trades more than those with low informa-
tion-asymmetry risk (low ASCt value). These clusters of risky trades suggest that
there is competition between informed traders. Informed traders try to maximize
their gains exploiting the temporal disagreement between the quoted prices and
the efficient price. Table 3 reveals that, after the execution of a risky trade, the infor-
mation-asymmetry risk persists due to the gradual adjustment of market quotes.
This short-term risk persistency increases with the adverse selection costs associated
to the trade at time t. 9
We have also considered an alternative specification of Eq. (7) that uses the trade-
time dummy variables Dt instead of Qt in order to truncate the AR(5) structure. This
new specification would capture differences in the AR(5) coefficients per trading
hour. However, the statistical tests performed do not reject the null hypothesis of
an equal AR(5) structure across trading hours. Therefore, we conclude that the re-
sults of Table 3 are due to differences in adverse selection costs and are not biased
by intra-daily regular patterns.
6. Price discovery and the information content of tradessides the ASC measure, the simulation procedure of the VAR model (3) pro-t
duces an additional output. This output is the time (in number of events) required by
quotes to disseminate all the information content in a particular trade, say st. We
have transformed it into real time using the distance in seconds between the time
stamp of the simulated trade and the time stamp of the stht trade afterwards. We de-
note DðsÞt the time series formed by the real-time distances for all trades. In this sec-
tion, we evaluate how long does it take for market participants to learn from trades
by studying whether the time of adjustment depends on the market conditions and
the characteristics of trades ðMCtÞ. That is, we check how does the price discovery
process depend on each trades expected risk. Table 4 summarizes the results of es-
timating Eq. (8) by OLS with the Newey and West (1987) robust standard errors.
9 Risk persistency could also be evaluated by applying the extended Dickey Fuller unit roots test tohreshold in (7). However, the t statistics of such a test are neither standard nor currently tabulated. It
be necessary to obtain the critic values by simulation, something that is out of the scope of this
.
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Table 4
The speed of learning from the information content of trades
Variable Coefficienta Std. Error
d0 (const.) 721.41 7.987
Vt ðd1Þ 0.0051 0.00018
Tt ðd2Þ 2.1679 0.05745
Rt ðd3Þ 26495.11 3001.8
St ðd4Þ 424.72 22.827
QDt ðd5Þ 0.4391 0.02076
D1t [9:30 10:00) 263.98 6.5971
D2t [10:00 11:00) 232.71 6.4680
D3t [11:00 12:00) 108.26 7.2188
D5t [13:00 14:00) 7.6262 8.6188
D6t [14:00 15:00) 123.29 7.3578
D7t [15:00 15:30) 225.56 7.0505
D8t [15:30 16:00) 276.85 6.7039
Adj. R2 0.2346
Prob > F 0.0000
This table summarizes the estimation of Eq. (8) by OLS robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation
(Newey and West, 1987). The variable st is an estimation of the time (in number of events) that quotes
need to capture all the information provided by a given trade. This st comes from the simulation of the
VAR model (3) and is trade specific. DðsÞt is the series formed with all st expressed in real time (s).
Vt trade size (in number of shares). Tt time (in s) since the preceding trade. St bid ask spread.
QDt quoted depth (average between depth at the ask and depth at the bid prices). Rt volatility
(implicit volatility of Dqt estimated with a GARCH (1,1) model), and D
j
t , j f1; . . . ; 8g, are dummy
variables that control for deterministic intra daily patterns.
a Format in bold means statistically significant at the 1% level.j6 4
mplicity, we assume linearity in the specification. In order to control for the
r patterns in trading frequency, we include the dummy variables Dht (with
13:00 as the control interval).As expected, the duration of the learning process depends on the moment of ex-
cution. During the less frequently traded hours (between 12:00 and 14:00), the pe-
iod of quote adjustment could go on around 12 min ðd0=60Þ. However, if the trade is
xecuted during the first half-hour of the trading session, this time is reduced to 7.5
in ððd0 þ c1Þ=60Þ, approximately. Moreover, Table 4 reveals that the adjustment
eriod is reduced with trade size and the volatility of prices. On the contrary, the ad-
ustment period is increased with liquidity and trade duration. Collectively, the higher
he expected adverse selection costs, the shorter the adjustment period. If we replace
Ct in Eq. (8) by the ASCt estimator, we end up with the same conclusion.
Our conjecture is that this finding is due to an increase in the trading intensity fol-
owing trades with high information-asymmetry risk. This effect accelerates the pro-
ess of price discovery. The increase in the trading intensity may reflect the sequential
eaction of the market to the same informative signal, an imitative behavior of other
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agents in the market, or even order-splitting by the same agent (see Easley and
OHara, 1987; Biais et al., 1995, and He and Wang, 1995). From the results in the
previous section we suggest that the temporal disagreement between quoted prices
and the efficient price may induce competition between informed traders. Admati
and Pfleiderer (1988), Easley and OHara (1992), and Holden and Subrahmanyam
(1992) develop alternative models in which competition between informed traders fa-
vors price efficiency, especially if their activity is based on the same informative sig-
nal. Consistently, our results imply that prices respond more quickly after a trade if
the estimated risk increases. Additionally, price discovery is faster during periods of
risky trading concentration. In Section 7, we provide further evidence supporting our
hypothesis of ‘‘market acceleration’’ after an informative trade.
Huang and Stoll (1996) measured the impact of a trade at time t by ðqtþs  qtÞxt,
where qtþs is the quote midpoint associated to the first trade executed (at least) s
minutes later. The value of s is the same for all trades and arbitrarily fixed. Huang
and Stoll use this measure to compare the adverse selection costs of a matched sam-
ple of NYSE and Nasdaq listed stocks. The evidence in this section indicates that the
results of Huang and Stoll may be biased because the value of s depends on the mo-
ment of execution, the concrete characteristics of the trade, and the market condi-
tions. Moreover, the value of st for a given trade might differ under different
microstructures. The difference between our measure of adverse selection costs and
the effective spread could be seen as an ex-ante and more flexible version of the
Huang and Stolls realized spread.
7. The short-term market response to risky tradesIn this section, we study the market impact of both the progressive adjustment ofmarket quotes and the associated risk persistency reported in previous sections. We
analyze how the market behavior after a trade depends on its expected information-
asymmetry risk. There is a large literature about unusual market patterns around lo-
calized informative events (e.g., Lee et al., 1993; Koski and Michaely, 2000, and
Goldstein and Kavajecz, 2000). Unusual patterns generally consist on increases in
trading activity and volatility, and reductions in liquidity both before and after
the event. Pre-event behavior is attributed to informed traders that anticipate the
informative shock. Post-event behavior is more difficult to interpret. If the public dis-
closure resolves the information asymmetry, the market should return to its pre-
event behavior. Kim and Verrecchia (1994) develop a model in which certain traders
are able to make superior judgments from public disclosures than others. This situ-
ation increases the information asymmetry after the event, reduces liquidity and
increases the trading activity and the volatility (see also Harris and Raviv, 1993).
Event studies compare the periods surrounding the events under analysis with a
benchmark that is not influenced by such (or other) informative events. Such a meth-
odology is not workable in our case because our events (trades) are not isolated from
other similar events. We have reported short-term persistency in the information-
asymmetry risk caused by clusters of trades that can be differentiated by its average
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level of adverse selection costs. We understand that clusters of trades with a similar
ASCðjÞ level can be associated to the same event. Hence, to avoid possible biases in
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rosterior tests, we proceed by filtering the sample. When we observe a sequence of
uys or sells that are very close to each other and with the same ASCðjÞ level, we
nly include the first trade of the sequence in the subsequent tests. 10 Furthermore,
esults in Table 4 indicated that the impact of a trade takes on average around 12
in to be negligible. Hence, we will consider the 15 min interval going after the ex-
cution of each trade. We focus on the post-event period because the adverse selec-
ion costs estimator ðASCtÞ measures the permanent impact of the unanticipated
omponent of the trade.
For each minute m ¼ f1; . . . ; 15g we compute the following variables: (a) the
umber of shares traded ðVoltþmÞ and (b) the number of trades completed ðNTtþmÞ.
hese two variables measure trading activity. (c) The standard deviation of the quote
idpoint ðVQtþmÞ measures volatility. (d) The average bid ask spread ðSPTtþmÞ and
e) the average quoted depth ðDPTtþmÞ, weighted by time, which stand for liquidity.
or trades time stamped during the last quarter-hour of the trading session, these
ariables are treated as missing for the minutes that include or exceed the official
losing hour (16:00 h). For each minute and using the filtered sample, we estimate
q. (9) by GLS. The dummy variables Dht and Q
j
t were defined in Section 4.2. The
ariable Smi is also one of the market indicators previously discussed. Our hypothesis
s that, after a trade, trading activity and price volatility increase and liquidity
ecreases with the trades expected information content.
Smi ¼
X8
h 1
X5
j 1
ah;jDhi Q
j
i þ emi : ð9ÞWe
hroug
lso s
SC(4)
han th
he an
ndings
11 Th
orresp
Vol10:0
0:00 1
ange.have shown that adverse selection costs are not uniformly distributed
hout the trading session. Moreover, activity, liquidity and volatility indicatorshow intra-daily regular patterns (e.g., Jain and Joh, 1988, and McInish and
ood, 1992). In Eq. (9), trades differ by the corresponding adverse selection costs
evel and by the moment of execution. Thus, we test for differences in market behav-
or after trades accomplished during the same hourly interval. Accordingly, Smi is
tandardized by trading interval. 11 Likelihood ratio tests (not reported) were used
o compare the model (9) with the alternative specification in which the Qjt dummies
10 We compute the median (in s) between two consecutive trades belonging to the same ASCðjÞ level,
ith j f1; . . . ; 5g. These medians are: 30 for ASC(1) trades, 24 for ASC(2) and ASC(3) trades, 17 fortrades and 13 for ASC(5) trades. If the time between two consecutive trades of the same type is less
e corresponding median, these trades are considered as originated by the same informative event.
alysis has been repeated using other filters and even using all trades in the sample. The main
are consistent.
e standardization method is robust to outliers. For example, consider the observation that
onds to the accumulated volume during the fifth minute after a trade time stamped at 9:58:00
2:00 10:02:59Þ. To standardize it we subtract the median of Vol for all the minutes traded in the period
1:00 during all the sample period. This difference is divided by the corresponding interquartile
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were removed. We rejected the null hypothesis of equality of the two specifications
for all Smi and for all intervals. This implies that the expected information-asymmetry
risk of trades provide information about the posterior market behavior, although the
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Fig. 2. Bid ask spread dynamics after a trade conditional on adverse selection costs. Figure shows the av
erage bid ask spread weighted by time (not standardized) for each information asymmetry risk level
(ASCðjÞ, j f1; . . . ; 5g) during the 15 min after a trade.value of the test statistic slowly decreases as we move away from the initial impact.
The main findings are summarized as follows. 12 As expected, immediacy costs are
increasing with adverse selection costs. For some trading intervals, these differences
persist during the 15 min analyzed. Fig. 2 shows the average bid ask spread weighted
by time (not standardized) for each ASCðjÞ level, j ¼ f1; . . . ; 5g, during the 15 min
interval. Differences are not statistically significant 6 or 7 min after the trade. We ob-
tain similar statistically significant differences in volatility; it increases with ASCðjÞ,
implying that trades with greater adverse selection costs tend to increase the uncer-
tainty about the true value of the stock. With respect to the quoted depth, the
ASC(5) (ASC(1)) trades are located in periods of higher (lower) depth than the other
trades. However, there is no monotonic increasing relationship between the quoted
depth and ASCðjÞ. After the trade, the quoted depth tends to increase with less in-
tensity (or even decrease) as the trade risk increases. Results are not a clear cut.
We find an unusually intense trading activity going after risky trades. Supporting
our ‘‘market acceleration’’ hypothesis, trades with a high expected risk lead to an in-
12 Due to space limitations, we do not provide the tables with the estimated coefficients of model (9).
However, they are included in the working paper version of this paper, which can be downloaded fromhttp://www.eco.uc3m.es/personal/cv/alvaroe.html.
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crease in trading intensity, probably due to the successive reaction of the market to
the new information and to the competition between traders. Hence, the widerspreads may be the result of the combination of a ‘‘liquidity consumption effect’’
caused by the increase in trading activity and a greater protectionism by liquidity
providers facing a greater risk of informed trading. In an attempt to judge the rele-
vance of the consumption effect in explaining unusual spreads and volatility, we also
estimate Eq. (10) with Smi ¼ fSPTmi ;VQmi g standardized.
Smi ¼ Volmi þNTmi þ
X8
h 1
X5
j 1
ah;jDhi Q
j
i þ emi : ð10ÞWe ob
liquid
Intain that the differences in immediacy costs are not completely explained by a
ity consumption effect. Indeed, the bid ask spread and the volatility, oncecorrected by trading activity, still increase with the adverse selection costs level
(ASCðjÞ, j ¼ f1; . . . ; 5g).
Globally, these findings suggest that market participants learn from the observ-
able features of the trade and the characteristics of the market. They revise their po-
sitions altering (at least) the liquidity of the stock and the intensity of trading. These
unusual market conditions are maintained due to the short-term persistency of the
information-asymmetry risk. It is important to remark that this behavior is indepen-
dent of the moment of the session.
8. Conclusionsthis paper, we have described the learning process of market participants fromtrading and we have studied how do they incorporate the trade-related information
into the stochastic process of prices. We have focused on the price discovery process
of IBM, a NYSE-listed stock. Our main concern was to evaluate the dynamics of the
price discovery process after a trade as a function of its information-asymmetry risk.
Hence, we have evaluated the risk of each IBM trade by estimating its permanent
price impact. The price impact depends on the simultaneous consideration of several
aspects of the trade and the market. This represents a more refined characterization
of adverse selection costs since in previous studies they typically identified the infor-
mation content of trades with their size. Our estimator is trade-specific and is based
on the IRF of a VAR model. This reduced-form approach accurately measures the
total impact of a trade by taking into account the dynamic effects of trades on both
the market quotes and on the trading process. Furthermore, we have also estimated
the time that quotes take to disseminate all the information content of a particular
trade.
Our empirical analysis has shown that the price discovery process accelerates after
risky trades. The trading frequency increases following trades with a high expected
informational content. Additionally, the progressive alignments of the quotes after
a trade originate clusters of trades with a similar (but decreasing) information-asym-
metry risk and, consequently, short-term risk persistency. This causes short-term
19
anomalies in market conditions that augment with the trade risk. Therefore, our
findings strengthen the relevance of the trading process in explaining the stochasticprocess of prices, but also draw a scenario that is far more complex than suggested
by one-period adverse selection costs models.
The analysis of the quote-adjustment period after trade-related shocks becomes
an attractive but almost unexplored issue in microstructure research. The findings
of this paper suggest several lines for further research, including the comparison
of the price discovery process of matched samples of stocks listed in markets with
different microstructures and the study of the differences in the learning process
between frequently and infrequently traded stocks.
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